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TRADE REGULATION
TEN YEARS UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS'
FRANCHISE ACT
In response to numerous complaints by automobile dealers, Congress,
in 1956, enacted the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act, or, as it is com-
monly called, the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act.' The act attempted
to balance the power that was heavily weighted in favor of automobile
manufacturers by giving a dealer a cause of action against a manufacturer
who fails to act in good faith regarding the franchise. 2 This comment will
consider whether the act has given the dealer a real or merely an illusory
cause of action. The cases which have arisen under the act will be examined
to analyze judicial construction of the provisions. Except as related to the
problem areas discussed herein, the state statutes governing the dealer-manu-
facturer relationship,3
 and the possibility of relief under the other antitrust
laws,' will not be considered.
The problems that the courts have considered in ,Dealers' Act cases
have arisen both within and without the provisions of the act. This comment
will concentrate on the principal problems which the courts have faced:
(1) defining "good faith"; (2) defining "coercion"; (3) determining those
activities that are permitted by the act; (4) defining "automobile manu-
facturer"; (5) obtaining jurisdiction and accomplishing service of process;
and, (6) determining the appropriate relief.
I. "Goo]) FAITH"
The act provides that an automobile dealer may bring suit against
an automobile manufacturer and recover damages due to the latter's failure
to act in good faith in performing or complying with the terms of the fran-
chise, or in terminating, cancelling, or failing to renew the franchise. 3 "Good
faith" is defined as the "duty of each party to any franchise . . . to act in
a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the, one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimi-
dation from the other party." These provisions raise the question whether
the courts are confined to the statutory definition, and, if so, whether the
definition should be strictly or liberally construed.
Only one court has considered the possibility of going outside the
1 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
2 H.R. Rep. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.
No. 2850].
3 At present there are approximately twenty state statutes which attempt to con-
trol the dealer-manufacturer relationship. For a complete list of these state statutes, see
Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those
Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers and the Legal System, 1965
Wis. L. Rev. 483, 521 nn.127-49 [hereinafter cited as Macaulay].
4 See generally Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by
Contract, 66 Yale L.J. 1135, 1165-67 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kessler].
5 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1964).
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statutory definition of "good faith." 7
 It reasoned that Congress could not
have intended the courts to be confined to the "immensely vague term" in
the statute. The court apparently thought that it could use other statutory
definitions8
 or the common law definitions 9 to aid in defining "good faith."
This argument has been rejected by other courts and specifically criticized
by the Fifth Circuit." It therefore appears well settled that the courts are
confined to the statutory definition"- and must attempt to clarify rather
than ignore it. Thus restricted, the courts are confronted with the problem
of whether to construe the definition strictly, as urged by the manufacturers,
or liberally, as urged by the dealers. The problem centers on whether the
words "so as" in the definition introduce words of qualification, which limit
lack of good faith to coercion, or words of illustration, which use coercion
merely as an example of lack of good faith.
The manufacturers argue that the wording of the act offers no assistance
in deciding whether the words introduce a qualification or an illustration.
Therefore, they contend that reliance must be placed only on the legislative
history, which clearly states that the words introduce a qualification."
They argue further that if the language is considered as introducing an
illustration, the key words would be "fair and equitable," and that those
words are so vague that the statute might well be unconstitutional as a
violation of due process of law." Consequently, the manufacturers assert
that the definition of "good faith" must be construed strictly.
1 Barney Motor Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 172, 174 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
E.g., Uniform Commercial Code § 2-103(1)(b), which provides that as to mer-
chants "good faith" means "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade."
9 A recent case defined "good faith" as "an intangible and abstract quality with
no technical meaning or statutory definition. It encompasses, among other things, an
honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or seek
unconscionable advantage." Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
10 Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962).
11 Compare Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).
12 see, e.g., Brief for Appellant, pp. 12-15, Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v.
Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3150 (U.S. Oct. 25,
1966). Frequently cited on this point are the following passages from the House Report
and the debates.
The term "fair and equitable" as used in the bill is qualified by the term "so as
to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation . . . ." In each
case arising under this bill, good faith must be determined in the context of
	 .
coercion or intimidation . . Each party to an automobile franchise would
have a special obligation to guarantee the other party freedom from coercion
or intimidation of any kind.
H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 9. The following exchange between Representative Halleck and
Judiciary Committee Chairman Celler took place on the floor of the House:
Mr. Halleck. In other words, while the words "fair and equitable" are used,
speaking of the relationship between the parties, those words "fair and equitable"
would be limited, as this language is contained in the bill, to "coercion and
intimidation?"
Mr. Celler. That is correct.
102 Cong, Rec. 14070 (1956).
19 E.g., Brief for Appellant, p. 15, supra note 12. See Globe Motors, Inc. v. Stude-
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The dealers, on the other hand, arguing for a liberal construction,
contend that the definition of "good faith" can be ascertained from the
wording of the act itself, and thus there is no need to resort to the legisla-
tive history.14
 They base their argument on a clause within the act which
gives the manufacturer a defense of lack of good faith on the part of the
deaIers.15
 Pointing out that few dealers are in a position to coerce a manu-
facturer, they argue that if lack of good faith is confined to coercion, the
manufacturer could rarely take advantage of this defense. Consequently,
they conclude that lack of good faith must mean something less than coer-
cion in this clause, and therefore should not be confined to coercion in
another clause. 16
 Furthermore, the dealers point out that the purpose of
the act will be defeated if lack of good faith is limited to the context of
coercion, since many of the evils against which Congress legislated will
remain untouched.'?
To date, no court has accepted the dealers' argument. On the con-
trary, the courts have readily accepted the manufacturers' position, and,
relying solely on the legislative history, have strictly construed the words
as qualification rather than illustration.ig It is submitted that the courts
should not have decided the issue as summarily as they apparently did,
since such a position substantially restricts those activities which constitute
lack of good faith, and as such has a significant effect on whether the act
will fulfill its purpose. It is not suggested that the courts accept the dealers'
arguments by the same apparent absence of reasoning with which they
accepted those of the manufacturers.'° It is suggested, however, that the
baker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1964); Garvin v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667, 670 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 318 F.2d 518
(3d Cir. 1963).
14 E.g., Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 896 (1963). See 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1266, at 59-62 n.73.5 (1962); Kessler 1178
n.284. But see Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale
L.J. 1, 105 (1959).
15 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
18 It has been suggested that the inclusion of the defense was merely a device
to overcome the objection that the act lacked "mutuality" of obligation imposed upon
dealers and manufacturers. Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 253, 263 n.68 (1957).
17
 Macaulay 760-61.
18 See, e.g., Kotula. v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 979 (1965); Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebacker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645
(3d Cir. 1964); Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 896 (1963); Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962); Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
257 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1966); General Motors Corp. v. Mac Co., 247 F. Sum.
723 (D. Colo. 1965); Zarbock v. Chrysler Corp., 235 F. Supp. 130 (D. Colo. 1964);
Augusta Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 213 F. Supp. 889 (ND.
Ga. 1963).
10 With regard to the weight of legislative histories, it has been said that debates
are an unreliable source for discovering the meaning of an act. Lapina v. Williams, 232
U.S. 78, 90 (1913). Committee reports stand on a different footing than debates. United
States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918). However, when the intent
of Congress cannot be drawn from the act itself, the courts are not authorized, merely
by statements in the report of the legislative committee, to read such an effect into the
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courts should reexamine the issue and consider thoroughly the merits of both
arguments before reaching a conclusion.
"COERCION"
Since the courts are currently confined to the strict construction, the
problem of determining what activities constitute coercion must be con-
sidered. Although the act does not define coercion, it provides that "recom-
mendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument . . ."
are, by themselves, consistent with good faith and thus not coercive. 20
The act is therefore of limited aid, and resort should be made to the legis-
lative history, which enumerates certain activities that might constitute
coercion, such as direct or indirect pressure upon the dealer to accept un-
wanted and unneeded merchandise, or to handle exclusively or sell a speci-
fied quota of merchandise. 2' It should be noted that these activities are
merely examples of coercion that are neither all-inclusive nor coercive
in all circumstances. 22 Generally, the courts have taken a very strict ap-
proach in determining what activities are coercive, resulting in a con-
spicuous lack of success on the part of the dealers in Dealers' Act litiga-
tion.23
 This attitude was candidly expressed by the court in Walker v. Ford
Motor Co., 24 when it stated that it could foresee few circumstances which
would justify the sanction which the act in its present form provided. Then,
in the course of its opinion, the court stated that insistence on the employ-
ment of unnecessary salesmen and mechanics, requirements that the doors
be kept open needlessly, and chastisement on the basis of unsound quota
analyses were not coercive. 26
The concept of coercion was further narrowed in Fabert Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 28 which held that when a manufacturer merely threatens
to do an act which he has a legal right to do under the terms of the franchise,
his conduct is not coercive. 22 The franchise provision in question gave the
manufacturer the right to withhold certain payments from the dealer in
the event of termination of the franchise which it could not withhold if the
dealer resigned.28 It is submitted that while a "legal right" theory may
be applied to a clause such as that in Fabert, and a correct result reached,
it should not be applied to the termination at will or renewal clauses. On
the theory of Fabert, if the franchise has a termination-at-will clause, a
threat by the manufacturer to terminate unless the dealer accedes to its
bill or to presume such an intent by Congress, even though such intent might be
inferred. Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 289 Fed. 924,
928 (D.C. Cir. 1923), aff'd, 263 U.S. 591 (1924).
20 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. 1 1221(e) (1964). The proviso is explained in
H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 8.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Ibid.
23 General Motors Corp. v. Mac Co., supra note 18, at 725.
24 241 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
25 Id. at 529-30.
20 355 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1966).
27 Id. at 890.
28 Id. at 889.
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demands would not be coercive, since the manufacturer has threatened to
do only that which he has a legal right to do. Such a result, however, appar-
ently ignores the particular demand made upon the dealer," and con-
travenes the fundamental policies of the act.
Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Roldsen,3° the first appellate de-
cision to hold for the dealer, under the act, posited another aid in the
determination of coercive conduct. In that case, the court distinguished
conditions which would benefit only the manufacturer, such as the forcing
of unneeded merchandise, from conditions which would be beneficial to both
parties, such as requirements of improved efficiency in service or manage-
ment. Although the fact situation in Volkswagen was clearly within the
first category,31 there will be many cases which do not fall clearly within
either one of the categories. Nevertheless, now there is some standard from
which to start in determining the types of activities which might be coer-
cive, a standard which was lacking prior to this case. 32 It is submitted that
if future courts use the Volkswagen test, the act will finally be giving the
dealers protection from the principal situation against which Congress
legislated, i.e., that in which the manufacturer seeks to take unreasonable
advantage of the dealer by means of its superior power.
Kotula v. Ford Motor Co.,33 decided two years before Volkswagen,
added nothing to the definition of coercion, but did impose two new proof
requirements upon a dealer attempting to establish a violation of the act.
In affirming a judgment n.o.v. for the manufacturer, the court first required
the dealer to establish that the alleged coercive act was the cause of the
termination.34 Secondly, the court stated that if a Dealer Policy Board has
approved the termination, the dealer must prove that the board failed to
act in good faith.35
In Kotula, the franchise of the plaintiff, a dealer for fourteen years,
was terminated. In the trial court, the jury found that a representative of
the defendant had threatened the dealer with termination of his franchise
23 Professors Kessler and Stern consider the threat to be coercive if the sanction
to be imposed upon the reluctant dealer is unlawful. See Kessler & Stern, supra note 14,
at 106 n.478. When the threat is to exercise a lawful sanction, there can be no coercion
under their standards. But see Berry Bros. Buick, Inc, v. General Motors Corp., supra
note 18, at 546, stressing the wrongful nature of the demand rather than the sanction.
30 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3150 (U.S. Oct, 25,
1966).
31 Briefly, the following facts appeared from the arguments of the case in the
court of appeals. The plaintiff-dealer alleged that the executives of the defendant de-
manded a one-third interest in a new franchise to be created to replace plaintiff's fran-
chise. The new franchise was to be capitalized at $100,000. Plaintiff, in return for most
of the assets of his existing franchise (valued at $230,000), was to receive a one-third
interest in the new business. The third share was to go two local real estate brokers.
Plaintiff refused to accept the defendant's proposal and was almost terminated at that
point, but for his threat to go to Germany and complain to the manufacturer. A year
and one-half later, defendant notified plaintiff that he was being terminated for cause.
32 Compare Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 18.
33 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965).
34 Id. at 736.
35 Id. at 739.
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unless he bought a certain truck," and furthermore, that the dealer was
unable to get delivery on two cars he had ordered until after he accepted
the truck. Plaintiff contended that there was coercion and intimidation
in the truck incident, and that a pattern of coercive activities emerged 27
which culminated in termination." The manufacturer, however, alleged
that the termination was a result of the dealer's failure to comply with the
terms of the franchise agreement. At this point the appellate court weighed
the good-faith reason for termination, i.e., the inadequacy of the dealer,
against the bad-faith reason for terminating, i.e., the truck incident, and
resolved the problem in favor of the manufacturer by reasoning that the
dealer had not established the truck incident as the cause of the termina-
tion.39
 Thus, on the basis of this case, when there are two possible reasons
for a manufacturer to terminate, it seems that the dealer must prove that
resistance to coercive conduct probably caused the termination.
It is submitted that this proof requirement imposes upon the dealer
an unreasonable burden, and that such an imposition is not called for by
the act. There is no provision in the act for any connection between the
coercive incident and the termination or failure to renew. The legislative
history, however, provides that the coercive activity "is actionable .
where it relates to the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of the
dealer's franchise."49 (Emphasis added.) That one incident is "related"
to another seems to be a much broader concept than that one incident is
"caused" by another: relationship may require only a discernible affinity
between two events,41
 whereas causation requires a consequential connec-
tion.42
 Although such an interpretation may subject the manufacturer to
liability where only a tenuous connection exists, it should be remembered
that the dealer must still prove such a relationship. Furthermore, it appears
that this interpretation is the only alternative to an automatic judgment for
the manufacturer when there exist two possible reasons for termination.
The weakness of the Kotula decision is further demonstrated by the
Volkswagen case, in which the court, on similar facts, reached a different
result. In both cases, the courts had to decide between two possible reasons
36 In May 1959, the representative told Kotula, "If you don't want that truck,
you don't want to be a Ford dealer." Kotula took the truck and sold it at a loss. Nine
months later, in February 1960, the same representative expressed personal animosity
toward Kotula. In May 1961, the same representative recommended the termination.
Id. at 735-36.
37 Id. at 736. For a case which holds that a pattern of coercion is necessary, see
Zarbock v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 18, at 134.
38 The evidence that there was a plot against Kotula included falsified reports in
the termination file. See Macaulay 775-76.
39 The court recognized that the dealer had presented evidence of a series of
coercive incidents, but said, "The difficulty with the plaintiff's premised theory is that the
favorable evidence, when judged by the controlling legal principles, wholly fails to
establish any causal connection between the coercive conduct relied upon, and the
termination of the agreement." 338 F.2d at 736.
40 H.R. Rep. 2850, at 9.
41 Cf. Nowland Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 1018 (7th Cir. 1931).
42 Cf. Kelsey v. Rebuzzini, 87 Conn. 556, 89 AU. 170 (1913).
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for termination, one legitimate and one coercive, and in both cases the
termination occurred more than a year and one-half after the alleged
coercive incident. Furthermore, in Volkswagen amicable relations were re-
stored for much of the interval between the alleged coercion and the termina-
tion. The jury in Volkswagen, like the jury in Kotula, found that the activi-
ties of the defendant were coercive. Despite the Kotula decision, the
appellate court affirmed the jury's finding of liability, and held, on the
basis of the record, that it was a jury question whether the termination was
related to—not caused by—the plaintiff's operation of the franchise or
the pressure applied by the defendant manufacturer. 46 It is submitted that
if the Volkswagen test had been used in Kotula, the jury verdict for plaintiff
would also have been affirmed. 44
The second aspect of the Kotula decision which may limit the act's
effectiveness was the court's statement regarding the manufacturer's termina-
tion policy. The court noted that the manufacturer had created a review
system, the final step of which was an independent investigation 46 of the
entire case by a Dealer Policy Board made up of top executives of the
manufacturer.46 The court stated that it could not find for the dealer
unless it first determined that the Policy Board was a party to the scheme
of coercive activity and had thus failed to act in good faith. Such a burden
is completely unwarranted under both the act and its legislative history.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the dealer will be able to get proof
of the complicity of the Policy Board, and thus, if this requirement is fol-
lowed in future cases, a dealer who may get by all the other obstacles
will surely fail on this one.
In conclusion to this section, it is apparent that the manner in which
most courts have interpreted the act frustrates its purposes. One of the
reasons for this frustration is the failure of the act to delineate coercive
activities. Although it would be impossible as well as impractical for Congress
to attempt to enumerate all the activities deemed to be coercive, a partial
enumeration consisting of some of the more important offenses would be
useful. Such an enumeration would give the courts some specific guidelines
in their determination of those activities which are offensive—guidelines
which are necessary if the dealers are to get the protection that the act
was intended to provide. The determination of coercive activities should
• 43 Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, supra note 30, at 444.
44 The manufacturer introduced evidence that the dealer was inadequate from 1957
to the date of termination. The truck incident occurred in May 1959, and it is inter-
esting to note that until that time, there was no mention of plaintiff's unsatisfactory
performance. Only after that incident was there any action taken toward the dealer,
and reports prepared for the termination file. The logical inference to be drawn from
these circumstances is that the termination was "related to" the truck incident and the
offended field representative.
45 Actually, the investigation in Kotula was not completely independent. See
Macaulay 777-78 n.650.
46 For the typical composition of the Ford Dealer Policy Board, its authority,
purpose, responsibilities, policies, and procedures, see Hearings on H.R. 11360 and S.
3897 Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 453-56 (1956) thereinafter cited as 1956 Hearings].
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no longer be left to the courts, which have taken ten years to establish a
test for that purpose.
III. PERMITTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE ACT
It is difficult to imagine that Congress intended manufacturers to be
bound to inefficient or inadequate dealers.47 Thus, it must be assumed that
the intent was to allow the manufacturer either to terminate such franchises
or to take steps to improve them. Prior to the act, when a manufacturer
deemed a dealer inefficient, an attempt was made to help the dealer improve
his performance," and only if that attempt was unsuccessful would the
franchise be terminated. Often, in such circumstances, threats were used
to force the dealer to improve himself. The Dealers' Act does not pro-
hibit such manufacturer activity. Indeed, if it did, the dealer would be in a
worse position after the act than he was before it, since, in such a case,
the manufacturer's only alternative would be to terminate the franchise."
Although the act gives the dealer a cause of action if the termination was
in bad faith, it seems clear that the dealer would rather keep his fran-
chise, with the manufacturer's "help" in making improvements, as before
the act, than be terminated and receive a cause of action. Under the act,
therefore, a major problem for the manufacturer is determining how far
it can go in attempting to improve the inadequate dealer without being
coercive.
Generally, the courts have held that the manufacturer has a wide
latitude in his choice of methods to improve an inefficient dealer. Their
reasoning has been that the manufacturer has the right to expect the dealer
to provide a suitable outlet for its products, 55
 to protect its good name, 51
and to compete effectively. 52
 In permitting certain activities even if "couched
in terms of coercion, or threat thereof,"53 the courts have relied upon
the statement in the House Report requiring "appropriate circumstances"
before actions of the manufacturer in "excess of normal sales recommenda-
tion and persuasion" would give rise to a cause of action." Acts of manu-
facturers which might otherwise have been coercive, but which have been
47 The legislative history of the act clearly states that the act was not intended
to prohibit a manufacturer from terminating or failing to renew the franchise of an
inadequate dealer. H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 9-10.
48 Kessler 1182.
49
 Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349, 354 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
50
 Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378,
383 (D.N.J. 1959).
51
 Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962).
52 Ibid.
53
 Leach v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 49, at 354.
54
 H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 9. The House Report's use of the phrase "appropriate
circumstances" in the determination of whether an act is coercive implies that in other
circumstances the same act would not be coercive. Furthermore, mention of the phrase
"appropriate circumstances" within the discussion of the fact that a manufacturer is not
bound to an inadequate dealer raises another inference: the same act when performed
with an adequate and an inadequate dealer may be coercive in the former instance but
not in the latter.
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allowed, include insistence upon performance of franchise terms under
threat of termination," establishment of a dealer nearby," and requests
that a dealer resign his franchise and thus receive benefits he would not
receive if he were terminated. 57
In order to defend such activities, however, the manufacturer must
establish that the dealer was inadequate. Usually, a manufacturer proves
this by demonstrating that the dealer has breached one or more of the
clauses in the franchise agreement. In arguing that a dealer was inadequate
because he had breached a franchise provision, the manufacturer should
first be required to show that the provision was material in that it would
seriously impair the integrity of the agreement if it were not enforced.
Obviously, a manufacturer should not be able to choose an insignificant
provision of the agreement and justify his conduct by claiming its breach.
It is submitted that the manufacturer will not be seriously hindered by
such a requirement, since a manufacturer probably should not be concerned
with the breach of an insignificant clause."
Once the manufacturer has established that the provision is material,
the next question becomes whether the standard of performance required
is reasonable. There are two ways in which the reasonableness issue may
arise. The first, and more common, is where a specific standard of conduct
is prescribed by the provision in question. In such a case, the court need
merely pass upon the standard agreed to by the parties. The second case
involves the situation in which the provision provides that the conduct
is to be "adequate" or "satisfactory." Here the court must interpret the
standard by which to compare the conduct of the parties.
In cases involving a specific standard, the courts have held the fran-
chise provisions litigated thus far to be reasonable, non-discriminatory,
objective, and dictated by sound business practice. 59 Although it could be
argued that if a court deletes a provision of the franchise as unreasonable,
it is rewriting the contract for the parties, such deletion is warranted when
the dealer did not have a real opportunity to bargain for the various terms
of the agreement."
55
 Victory Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 357 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1966);
Milos v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 18; Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349
(ND. Cal. 1960).
58 Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963); H.R.
Rep. No. 2850, at 9-10.
57
 Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 26, at 889.
58
 For litigated clauses held to be material, see, e.g., Victory Motors, Inc.' v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., supra note 55 (minimum sales responsibility); Garvin v. Ameri-
can Motors Sales Corp., supra note 56 (submission of financial statement) ; Pierce v.
Ford Motor Co., supra note 18 (manufacturer approval of buyer of franchise); Wood-
ward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887
(1962) (prohibition on changing location without prior written approval of manu-
facturer) ; Augusta Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra note
18 (requirement of adequate capital).
55
 E.g., Milos v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 18, at 717.
88
 The Dealers' Act does not operate on the duties of the parties toward each other
during the franchise negotiations. See 1956 Hearings 238-41. Compare Uniform Corn-
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In situations where the provision requires that the performance be
"adequate" or "satisfactory," the court must determine what type of per-
formance satisfies the standard. The policy of allowing the manufacturer
complete discretion with regard to these terms has been condemned." As
an alternative, the courts should attempt to measure the dealer's compliance
with the term by objectively determining a definite standard of conduct
and then applying a substantial performance test to it. 62 This definite
standard could be determined by measuring the actual performance of other
dealers similarly situated to the plaintiff dealer. The substantial performance
test should be applied for two reasons. First, it would give the dealer the
benefit of the doubt which was caused by the indefinite provision. This
seems reasonable since the manufacturer dictated the terms of the agree-
ment.° Second, the substantial performance test would allow more flex-
ibility than strict application of the definite standard. Such a method of
interpreting indefinite franchise requirements seems consistent with the
act, for it attempts to arrive at a reasonable measure of performance with
which the dealer must comply, and allows the manufacturer to enforce
the franchise up to that point.
In summary, if a provision is not material, or if it is material but the
standard required is unreasonable, or if upon determination of an objective
standard the dealer is found to have complied, a technical breach by the
dealer would not be sufficient to classify him as inadequate and thus enable
the manufacturer to take those steps allowed with respect to inadequate
dealers. If, however, the provision is material and reasonable, or the dealer
has not complied with an objectively-determined standard, it may be en-
forced even though it is burdensome to the dealer."
IV. "AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER"
The Dealers' Act defines an automobile manufacturer as
any person, partnership, corporation, association, or other form of
business enterprise engaged in the manufacturing or assembling
of passenger cars, trucks, or station wagons, including any person,
partnership, or corporation which acts for and is under the control
of such manufacturer or assembler in connection with the distribu-
tion of said automotive vehicles."
Clearly this definition includes the giant corporations in Detroit, but it is
not so clear that Congress intended to include independent distributors-
mercial Code § 2-302, which allows the court to refuse to enforce a clause that is
found to have been unconscionable at the time of the making of the contract.
61 Kessler 1183.
82 The test of substantial performance recommended would be similar to that pro-
pounded by Judge Cardozo: "We must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to
be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence.
Then only can we tell whether literal fulfillment is to be implied by law as a condition."
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
63 See Restatement, Contracts § 236(d) (1932); 3 Corbin, Contracts § 559 (1960).
64 General Motors Corp. v. Mac Co., supra note 18, at 726.
65 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1964).
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those who are not merely extensions of the manufacturer within distribu-
tion systems.66
 If the distributor may be held, it would be in addition to,
rather than as a substitute for, the manufacturer. The dealers have argued
that they may bring suit against an independent distributor because such
distributor is included within the statutory definition. 67 The distributors
argue that they are not included within the statutory definition, and that
the legislative history gives no indication of an intent to hold anyone other
than the manufacturer liable for coercion of a dealer." It is submitted that
the statutory language is ambiguous concerning the inclusion of independent
distributors within the statutory definition of "automobile manufacturer."
The argument for inclusion seems to conflict with the statutory definition of
an "automobile dealer,"" for, under that language, a distributor is a
dealer." It would seem to be inconsistent for a party to be both a dealer
and a manufacturer at the same time. Furthermore, if the distributor were
held to be a dealer, he could not be sued by another dealer, because the act
authorizes suits only against manufacturers."
In order to avoid these incongruous results, one of the premises must
be changed. The premise that an independent distributor is a dealer cannot
be changed by the courts, since it is statutory in origin. On the other hand,
the premise that an independent distributor is an automobile manufacturer
can be changed, since it is merely a judicial interpretation of the definition.
The statute does not say that a distributor is a manufacturer. Instead, it
defines a manufacturer as a firm which is engaged in manufacturing or
assembling, including a distributor. "Including" should not be considered
as adding anything new to the definition. It does not mean that distributors
as well as manufacturers and assemblers shall be the statutory automobile
manufacturer. 72
 The meaning that should be given is that the manufacturer
could also be comprised of distributors which act for it and are under its
control," and for whose acts, therefore, the manufacturer alone should be
held liable. Furthermore, the legislative history seems to suggest that only
the manufacturer can be held." Such a result appears to be desirable, since
66 1956 Hearings 152.
67
 E.g., Brief for Appellee, p. 27, Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, supra
note 30.
68 E.g., Brief for Appellant, pp. 29-34, Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen,
supra note 30.
al The statute provides that an "automobile dealer" shall mean "any person, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other form of business enterprise . . . operating
under the terms of a franchise and engaged in the sale or distribution of passenger cars,
trucks, or station wagons." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(c) (1964).
70 Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 81 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
71 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
72 Cf. United States v. The Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. 443, 452 (1808).
73 Cf. Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 463 (1910); Blankenship v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 161 F.2d 168, 169 (4th Cir. 1947).
74 Repeated reference is made to the liability of the manufacturer for acts of his
distributors. No reference is made to holding the distributor liable, and thus, on the
basis of the legislative history, there seems to be no justification for doing so. The
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a distributor is only a middleman, and any relief against him will usually
not get to the source of the problem--the manufacturer standing behind him.
If only the manufacturer can be held liable for acts of his distributors,
the question then becomes whether the manufacturer is liable for all those
acts of a distributor which are coercive. In attempting to explain the scope
of the manufacturer's liability, the House Report indicated that the "manu-
facturer is liable only for his own 'coercion, intimidation, or threats of
coercion or intimidation' or the acts of agents or distributors subject to
his control."75
 (Emphasis added.) This statement was explained to mean
that "the factory shall be liable only for the conduct of persons over whom
it has control and for whose conduct it is responsible." 76
 (Emphasis added.)
The manufacturer can have control of a distributor in two ways. First, it
may have control by the so called "instrumentality rule," which requires
complete domination of the subsidiary by the parent corporation." Second,
"a manufacturer can exercise the same kind of control through contractual
provisions with a stranger as it can by owning and directing a subsidiary
corporation." 78
It should be noted, however, that more than control is required, for
the explanation quoted above requires that the manufacturer be responsible
for the acts as well. There are two interpretations of "responsible." First,
it could be argued that "responsible" should be taken in the causative sense,
that is, that the manufacturer would be liable only if the specific coercive
acts of the distributor could be traced to some action by the manufacturer.
Thus, if a manufacturer coerced an adequate distributor who passed the
coercion on to an adequate dealer, the dealer and distributor would have
an action against the manufacturer.75 In Barney Motor Sales v. Cal Sales,
original definition in the act provided that a manufacturer was "any person, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other form of business enterprise engaged in the
manufacturing or assembling of passenger cars, . . . including any person, partnership,
or corporation which acts for such manufacturer or assembler . . ." S. 3879, H.R.
11360, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). Objecting to this definition, the Department of Justice
pointed out that "the manufacturer is made liable for 'coercion, intimidation, or threats
of the same not only by himself, but also, for instance, by his distributors—whether
or not they are subject to his control." 1956 Hearings 133. In commenting upon this
objection, Senator O'Mahoney stated:
This is a valid objection. A manufacturer should not be responsible for the
conduct of persons over whom he exercises no control. The reason for the broad
language in the definition of manufacturer was to forestall the manufacturer
from escaping the consequences of this bill by establishing a sales corporation
which would enter into franchise agreements with dealers.
1956 Hearings 27. Of course, the act now includes the phrase "and is under the control of
such manufacturer." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1964).
75
 H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 7.
76 1956 Hearings 27.
77 . See Steven v. Rosco Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir.
1963); 1 Fletcher, Corporations § 43, at 204-06 (1963).
78 Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 35 U.S.!, Week 3150 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1966).
79 It seems to follow that if a manufacturer coerced an inadequate distributor
and the coercion was passed to a satisfactory dealer, the dealer would have a cause of




 this causative approach received judicial support. The court in that
case spoke in terms of a distributor being utilized to make the dealer sub-
servient, and indicated that the Dealers' Act could thwart the unfortunate
squeeze on the distributor which occurs when he is exploited by the manu-
facturer for the purpose of applying pressure to the dealer.
The alternative interpretation of "responsible" would result in liability
to the manufacturer when the distributor is acting within the scope of his
authority. This interpretation differs from that set out above in that the
specific coercive act cannot be traced to the manufacturer, but is within
the authority given to the distributor by the manufacturer. The net effect
of this approach would be to increase those activities for which the manu-
facturer would be liable. For example, if it were the distributor's duty to
promote vigorously the sale of the manufacturer's automobiles, a great many
activities in the sales area would be imputable to the manufacturer for the
purpose of establishing its liability under the scope-of-authority test. How-
ever, none of the activities of the distributor may have specifically originated
from the manufacturer, and therefore there would be no manufacturer
liability under the specific-act test.
It should be noted that acts which are performed by an independent
distributor on his own initiative, or for which the manufacturer cannot
be held liable on the scope-of-authority argument, fall into a "no-man's-
land" under the statute, since there seems to be no party who may be sued by
the aggrieved dealer. 81 In such cases there may be an action against the
distributor on a breach-of-contract theory, but unless the court were willing
to overrule pre-Dealers' Act cases, the chances of success are minimal. 82
In Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 83 a distributor, on his
own initiative, coerced a dealer in order to secure a partnership interest in
the dealer's franchise. Thus, the case seemed clearly to fall within the above-
mentioned "no-man's-land." However, when the dealer brought suit against
the distributor under the Dealers' Act, the suit was allowed. The court felt
that although only manufacturers could be sued according to the explicit
terms of the act, a distributor might be sued as an agent of the manufacturer.
The court then held that an agency relationship would be established if the
distributor were subject to • the control, or right of control, of the manu-
facturer. The court proceeded to find that the requisite control existed in the
dealer should, as in the normal two-party, manufacturer-dealer situation, be the deter-
minative factor. No different result should obtain when the situation includes a distribu-
tor who, in effect, is merely a conduit for the manufacturer's coercive activities.
80 178 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
81 Seeking to improve an unsatisfactory distributor, a manufacturer might en-
courage him to apply pressure to those dealers below him who are inadequate. If the
manufacturer makes it plain that the adequate dealers are not to be pressured, it should
escape any liability for coercion to those dealers; responsibility is avoided under both
the specific-authority theory and the general-authority theory. Such a case would fall
within the "no-man's-land" area, for neither the manufacturer nor the distributor could
be held.
82 See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1940) ; Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933).
83 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3150 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1966).
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instant case, since the terms of the franchise gave the manufacturer control
over large parts of the distributor's operation. 84 Conceding, arguendo, that a
distributor can be liable under the act, it is submitted that the case is errone-
ous on the control issue, for it seems to ignore the statutory requirement that
the distributor "act for" the manufacturer as well as be under its control."
It is difficult to perceive how the distributor acted for the manufacturer
in this case, since the coercion resulted from the distributor's demands for
a partnership interest in the dealer's business.
Furthermore, if the principle enunciated by the court were applied in a
situation where the dealer brought the action against the manufacturer,
the "right of control" argument would be an unwarranted broadening of
the manufacturer's liability. The dealer in Volkswagen did not argue re-
garding the right of control, but merely attempted to show actual contro1. 86
The fact that the manufacturer dictates the terms of the franchise between
it and the distributor would always seem to give the manufacturer the right
of control over its distributor. On the other band, if liability were limited
to actual control, the success of a suit against the manufacturer would de-
pend upon the franchise terms in force at the time of the act. Moreover, the
addition of "right of control" to the statutory language "and is under the
control of" seems to be contrary to agency law, since an agent is "subject
to the control" of the principa1,87 but a servant is "subject to the control or
right of control" of the master." Unless the court would be willing to classify
the distributor as a servant, it is submitted that "right of control" is an im-
proper test.
In conclusion, it should first be noted that although the problem of
whether a distributor is a manufacturer, and thus subject to suit under the
act, involves only a few makes of automobiles, it comprises a significant per-
centage of Dealers' Act litigation." Therefore, in order to avoid the problems
created by the ambiguous language concerning distributors, it would seem
wise for Congress to state unequivocally whether the distributor is subject
to suit by a dealer under the act." Some states already do this: the Louisiana
84 Id. at 441-42.
85 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1964).
86 See Brief for Appellee, pp. 30-33, supra note 83.
87 Restatement (Second), Agency § 1 (1958).
88 Id. § 2.
80 A compilation as of Nov. 1, 1965, indicates that over 25% of the suits brought
under the Dealers' Act are brought by dealers in lines which use the distributor system.
Macaulay 743.
00 Dealers' Act cases which have involved distributors as defendants have reached
varying results on the issue of whether a distributor is a manufacturer. The issue
was noted in one case, although the case was decided on other grounds. Snyder v.
Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 240, 243 (W.D.S.C. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 357 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 987 (1966). In other cases
the manufacturer issue was completely ignored. Wagner v. World Wide Autos. Corp.,
201 F. Supp. 22 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World
Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960). In one case there was dictum to
the effect that an independent distributor might well be outside the statutory defini-
tion of an "automobile manufacturer." Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World
Wide Auto. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 141, 144 (D.N.J. 1963).
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statute, for example, prohibits "a manufacturer of motor vehicles, a distribu-
tor, a wholesaler, distributor branch or factory branch, or officer, agent, or
other representative thereof" from engaging in certain activities. 9 '
V. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Dealers' Act contemplates an action by a financially-weak dealer
against a giant corporation. It therefore seems desirable to give the dealer
the opportunity to choose the most convenient forum in which to bring his
action, since litigating in a distant forum will often entail great expense.
Accordingly, the problems of acquiring jurisdiction over a manufacturer and
obtaining service of process on a nonresident corporation must be considered,
for it would be extremely helpful to the dealer if he could require the manu-
facturer to defend the suit in the dealer's jurisdiction.
A corporate party is subject to suit within a certain jurisdiction if it has
some "minimum contacts" with that jurisdiction. 92 Snyder v. Eastern Auto
Distribs., Ine. 9a has gone further than any other case under the Dealers' Act
in allowing jurisdiction over the manufacturer. In that case, the business
transacted with the plaintiff dealer was the only contact that the defendant
had in the plaintiff's jurisdiction; thus, when the plaintiff's franchise was
terminated, there was no longer any contact with the state. In holding
the defendant amenable to suit within the jurisdiction, the court concluded
that the critical time with regard to the establishment of jurisdiction was
when the cause of action arose; 94 if the defendant had sufficient minimum
contacts at that point, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the state. The
court then found that doing business with the dealer constituted the requi-
site minimum contacts. Furthermore, the court stated that the defendant
remained answerable within the jurisdiction for a reasonable time after it
had ceased its contact." It seems, therefore, that the defendant manufacturer
must be subject to the jurisdiction of the dealer's state.
The dealer's problem, however, does not end with the acquisition of
jurisdiction, for he still must serve process on the defendant. Because the
manufacturer will usually be a nonresident corporation, or will not be found
within the borders of the state, there is a question whether extraterritorial
service can be made upon such corporation, and, if so, in what manner.
Early in the history of he act, an argument was made that the extraterritorial
service-of-process provisions of the Clayton Act could be used in Dealers'
Act cases to accomplish service on a nonresident." This argument, however,
was rejected by the court, even though the Dealers' Act was intended to
supplement the antitrust laws, because it was "the intent of Congress that
91 La. Rev. Stat. § 32:1254(A)(3) (Supp. 1962). Accord, Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 168.27(14) (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 562(g), 565(j) (1962).
22 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945).
03 357 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 987 (1966).
04 Id. at 556.
95
 Ibid.
90 Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122, 124 (N.D. Iowa
1960).
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the rights and remedies of one bringing an action under the Dealers' Act
are found and contained in that Act, and that Act stands on its own as to
those matters."" The court then held that since the act itself had no provi-
sions for service of process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed
service in Dealers' Act cases." Since the pre-1963 Rules did not allow
extraterritorial service except in limited cases, the dealers were somewhat
handicapped." •
It appears that this obstacle will no longer present a problem due to
the 1963 amendment to the service-of-process provisions of the Federal
Rules. As amended, they allow service upon a party not an inhabitant of,
or found within the state, in the manner prescribed by federal statute, or by
a statute or rule of the state in which the district court sits;"° and they
allow service beyond the territorial boundaries of a state when authorized
by federal or state statute.'" Clearly, these amendments provide that extra-
territorial service of process can be made in a federal action pursuant to a
valid state statute. 102
 Thus it is necessary to look to the state statutes con-
cerning service of process in order to determine whether a nonresident
corporation may be served beyond the boundaries of a state. Under the
typical state statute, service may be made upon a nonresident by using one
or more of the following methods: (1) personal service either within or
without the state upon an officer, director, or managing agent of the
defendant; (2) publication and mailing of the summons to the defendant
if he can not be found within the state; or, (3) service on an agent au-
thorized by appointment or by law to accept service for the defendant.'"
Under such a statute, extraterritorial service is clearly permissible. The
Volkswagen easel" presents an example of how the amended Federal Rules
would facilitate service of process and aid the dealer. In that case, the plain-
tiff went to another jurisdiction in order to serve process on the defendant.
Had the amendments been in effect, plaintiff could have served the defendant
by publication pursuant to the statute of the state wherein plaintiff
resided."5
97 Id. at 129.
98 Id. at 123-25.
99
 Before 1963, the Rules provided that "all process other than a subpoena may
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial
limits of that state." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), 28 U.S.C.A. (1960).
100
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
101
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
102 2 Moore, Federal Practice 11 4.32[2] (2d ed. 1965).
103 Some state statutes require service upon an official of the state with concurrent
notice to the defendant. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-59(a) (Supp. 1965); Ind. Stat.
Ann. § 25-316 (Burns 1960); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1958). Others provide for
service to be made directly upon the nonresident, either personally or by mail. E.g., III.
Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 302, 313
(McKinney 1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05, .06 (Supp. 1966).
104 Supra note 83.
105
 The facts of the Volkswagen case appear to satisfy the statutory requirements




In summary, there will probably be no difficulty for the dealer in
gaining jurisdiction over the defendant. Once jurisdiction is obtained,
whether service can be accomplished will depend upon the liberality of
the state service-of-process statutes. The result that is reached by combining
liberal jurisdiction and service requirements is desirable in view of the
great expenses that often accompany Dealers' Act litigation. 106 It is far
more equitable for the small dealer to maintain the suit in his own juris-
diction than to have to pay the costs of moving his evidence and witnesses
to a distant forum.
VI. REMEDIES UNDER THE ACT
A. Damages
The act provides that the dealer shall recover "the damages by him
sustained and the cost of the suit . . . ."'" This broad provision creates
problems of computation for the dealer, and involves uncertainty due to
the existence of two variables: the future duration and the future annual
profit of the franchise. The product of these factors represents the total
loss to be recovered. In attempting to resolve the uncertainties in the com-
putation, the effect that a large or small recovery will have on the parties
should be noted. For example, if recovery were limited to a very small
amount because of uncertainty in computation, it is unlikely that many
suits would be brought. Furthermore, small dealer recoveries would not
serve the purposes of the act, since the injured dealer would not receive
adequate compensation for his real losses, and the manufacturer would not
be deterred from acting coercively in the future. On the other hand, if
recoveries are too large, the manufacturers may be deterred to too great an
extent, that is, they may hesitate to press an inadequate dealer for improve-
ment, because they fear being held liable for substantial damages."'"
(a) When service of the summons can not be made as prescribed in Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the defendant after due diligence
can not be found within the Virgin Islands, ... and it also appears that a
cause of action exists against the defendant, . . . the court shall grant
an order that service be made by publication of the summons in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the defendant is a foreign corporation, and has property within the
Virgin Islands, or the cause of action arose therein;
100 The costs to a dealer of a Dealers' Act suit have been estimated to be as high
as $50,000. See Macaulay 753 n.538.
1 °1 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964). In the Senate, the bill as
originally introduced provided for double damages. S. Rep. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1956). The debate on the Senate floor prompted a change to compensatory
damages. The House version deleted the word "compensatory" and substituted the
present provision. H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 8.
108 If the manufacturer feels that he will subject himself to a significant risk of
liability by attempting to improve the performance of an inadequate dealer, he may
arbitrarily terminate the dealer and escape liability. It has been held that arbitrary
refusal to renew does not result in manufacturer liability. Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 257 F. Supp. 542 (ED. Pa. 1966).
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The first damage problem is a determination of what the future duration
of the franchise would have been, but for the termination. Clearly, if the
franchise were for a specific duration, there would be no problem with this
computation, for damages could be awarded to the end of the term.'"
However, most franchise agreements are for an indefinite term and are
terminable at will subject to the giving of notice. Prior to the passage of the
act, when dealers with these latter franchises contended that they should
be awarded damages for a .certain number of years, the manufacturer re-
plied, with great success, that since it could terminate at will, the dealer
could only recover the losses for the period between notice and termina-
tion.11 ° The rationale for the manufacturer's argument was that its legal obli-
gation to the dealer ceased when the notice period expired, and thus there
could be no recovery beyond that period. If that rationale were used in a non-
renewal situation, there could be no recovery at all, for when the term ends,
the manufacturer's obligation would cease, and there would be no period
of time comparable to the notice period in the termination-at-will cases
for which even a small recovery could be granted. This entire line of
reasoning was ignored by the court in the only post-act case to deal with
the duration problem, Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp. 1" This court
held that the dealer, who had a one-year, renewable franchise, could recover
all the profits that he would have earned over the period for which the
franchise, in the normal course of events, would have been continually
renewed. The jury was instructed to consider the dealer's "habits," his
"attitude toward life," his "previous health," and the "possibility he might
die a natural death" in making their determination of future duration. 112
Even mortality tables were to be allowed in evidence if the jury believed
that the franchise would, in the normal course of events, be renewed yearly
for the remainder of the dealer's life. 113
In effect, the Garvin court equated the indefinite, terminable-at-will
franchise with the definite, renewable franchise. It then said that in both
cases the recovery would not be limited to that period of time during which
the manufacturer has a legal obligation to the dealer, but rather that the
109 Such a result would seem to induce manufacturers to change from indefinite-
term franchises to short-term franchises, since under a short-term franchise the manu-
facturer would be able to limit any liability to the duration of that short term. However,
in Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963), where a one-year term was in the fran-
chise, the court felt that it need not limit recovery 'to that one year.
110 E.g., Chevrolet Motor Co. v. McCullough, 6 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1925). The
problem of awarding damages in termination-at-will contracts has arisen in contexts
other than the Dealers' Act. For two such cases which take variant positions on the
issue of whether such damages should be awarded at all, compare Goodman v. Dicker,
169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) with Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d
123 (1958).
111 202 F. Supp. 667 (\VD. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 318 F.2d 518 (3d
Cir. 1963).
112 Comment, The Elusive Measure of Damages for Wrongful Termination of
Automobile Dealership Franchises, 74 Yale L.J. 354, 363 (1964). •
113 Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra note 111, at 672.
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recovery may be for that period of time when the dealer's franchise would
have been effective but for the coercive termination or failure to renew.
It is submitted that the Garvin court was correct in its implicit refusal to
distinguish between the indefinite-term franchise and the renewable franchise,
for, although such franchises are different in form, they are similar in
substance. Both are, in effect, long-term franchises, for in the normal situa-
tion, the renewal is a matter of course if the dealer is adequate, just as in
the normal situation, the termination-at-will clause is not invoked unless the
dealer is inadequate. Thus, in both cases, the dealer will retain his franchise
only as long as his performance is satisfactory. The only difference between
the two is the manner of severing the relationship, a difference which should
not have an effect on the amount of recovery if the severance is in bad faith.
The Garvin approach presupposes that the dealer will hold his franchise
until death or disability. Although that assumption is not generally correct,
such an approach is appropriate in those cases involving long-term dealers
who have exhibited stability in their past relationship with the manufacturer.
There may well be a significant number of such cases arising, for in 1956
over thirty per cent of all General Motors dealers had held their franchises
for over twenty years. 114
The obvious objection to the Garvin test is that the jury will engage
in "wild speculation" 445 and award unreasonably large damages to the dealers.
However, the fact that the jury in Garvin limited recovery to what would
be, at most, future profits for one year, evidences the fact that juries may
not be as easily convinced of what will be the "normal course of events,"
and furthermore indicates that they will confine recovery to a reasonable
amount.416
The problem of certainty of future duration is more formidable with
regard to the other group of dealers—the seventy per cent that have held
their franchises for less than twenty years. The greater influence of extrinsic
events must be taken into consideration in these cases: the dealer might
sell his business or allow his franchise to lapse, or the manufacturer may
discontinue production of the dealer's line of cars,'" or the manufacturer
might lawfully sever the franchise agreement. Even if these possibilities were
included in the instructions to the jury, it would be impossible for the jury to
do more than speculate as to their likelihood."8 It has been suggested that
statistics could be compiled at each trial, showing the normal duration of a
114 H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 12.
115 Comment, 48 Cornell L.Q. 711, 731 (1963).
116 The evidence in Garvin showed a loss of $4,000 for parts and $7,000 for equip-
ment that became useless due to nonrenewal, $10,000 for goodwill lost as a result of
the nonrenewal, and $1,500 for rent payable on the dealer's unexpired lease. The evi-
dence also indicated that the dealer's loss of profits for one year would be approximately
$18,000. The jury's verdict of $20,000 was probably based upon some combination of
these figures. Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra note 111, at 672.
117 The Ford Motor Company's experience with the short-lived Edsel exemplifies
such a case. See Jim Barnett Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 502 (5th Cir.
1966).
118 Comment, supra note 112, at 367.
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hypothetical dealer similarly situated to the plaintiff dealer. Such a norm
might then be accepted as prima facie evidence of the period for which there
should be recovery, subject to adjustment by the court if the manufacturer
can show some extrinsic event, such as imminent discontinuance of the
dealer's product, which would shorten the period.' 15
The second problem in the damage computation is the determination
of the potential profit of the franchise. Generally, in order to recover, it must
be demonstrated that profits would have existed, 12° and it must be shown
with reasonable certainty what those profits would have been.' 21 It is in-
sufficient for a dealer to testify to his lost profits unless he is able to sub-
stantiate his claims with records. 122 If a requirement of certainty were
strictly enforced, recovery might be prevented because of the obvious
problems in computing future profits. 123
 Thus, a less strict application of
the certainty rule would be desirable. Since the Dealers' Act is an antitrust
law, authority for applying a more flexible standard may be found in treble-
damage antitrust litigation, where the requirement of certainty has been
reduced to a "best-evidence" rule.'"
Even if the certainty rule is not strictly applied, however, the dealer
will have significant proof problems if he has not compiled a record of past
performance sufficient to give an indication of future profits. This is the
dilemma of the dealer who has not been in business long enough to compile
a record of earnings. In that case, loss of profits is too speculative and thus
should not be awarded. Alternatively, this type of dealer should be allowed
to recover "reliance" damages, that is, those damages sustained acquiring
adequate facilities in anticipation of performing the franchise obligations. 125
Such damages are easily computed.
There are several other possible methods that have been suggested for
the computation of damages. Capitalization of earnings may be used as
a method of recovering the value of the franchise as reflected by its profit
potential.' 25 This method will reflect not merely the tangible operating assets
119
 Id. at 369-70; Comment, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 253, 267 (1957).
129 Ellerson v. Grove, 44 F.2d 493, 499 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Klein v. American Lug-
gage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924, 945 (D. Del. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323
F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
121
 Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955).
See generally 5 Corbin § 1020-28 (1964); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1950).
122
 Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, supra note 83, at 446.
123 See, Note, Lost Profits as Contract Damages, 65 Yale L.J. 992, 1018-20 (1956).
124 See, e.g., Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story
Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 255 (1931). See generally
Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust
Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363, 391-92 (1954).
125 Compare Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See
Restatement, Contracts § 333 (1932); Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1251 (1957). See
generally 5 Corbin, Contracts §§ 1031, 1035 (1964).
126 See Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Slade, 122 Conn. 451, 190 Atl. 616 (1937);
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1251 (1957). See generally 1 Bonbright, The Valuation
of Property 233-66 (1937); 1 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 283-349 (4th
ed. 1941). The capitalization-of-earnings method assumes that similarly-situated businesses
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of the business, but also the intangible assets. In Volkswagen the court ap-
proved the use of capitalization, but required the figures which were to be
used in the computation to be adequately substantiated.'27 This method is
particularly inappropriate in computing damages for an infant business, as it
requires a reliable past-earnings figure. This figure cannot be valid where
earnings often fluctuate greatly from actual potential due to countless ex-
trinsic circumstances. This is essentially the same problem encountered in
the loss-of-profits computation. 128
In an attempt to avoid the uncertainty problems of a recovery based
upon a speculative loss of profits, it has been suggested that recovery be
based upon the difference between what the dealer could have sold his busi-
ness for before and after the termination. 129 The pretermination value would
be determined by an appraisal based upon the business' capitalized earnings
and its individual assets. The post-termination value would be based upon
any "going-concern value" remaining, i.e., used car sales and repair service,
or liquidation value, or the amount for which a new dealer, procured by the
manufacturer or the cancelled dealer, is willing to buy the dealership as a
unit.'3° This approach has been criticized on the ground that it is unlikely
that a dealer would realize the pretermination value because of the control
which the manufacturers have over the purchase price of franchises." This
control over the price is exercised through the franchise provision which re-
quires the manufacturer's approval before the franchise may be sold. This
approval is withheld if the purchase price is too high, on the ground that the
new dealer may weaken his financial position if he is forced to pay too much
for the franchise. Obviously, the efforts to capitalize in this situation will
encounter the same difficulties that they would have encountered if used to
compute profit potential.
in the same industry yield a similar rate of return on capital investment. The rate of
return is represented in terms of a percentage of total worth, which is 100%. Therefore,
if the business' annual earnings and the industry's rate of return are known, the total
worth may be computed by dividing the latter into the former. For example, if a business
yields $80,000, and the average industry rate of return is 8%, then the total worth of the
business is $1,000,000.
127 Supra note 83, at 446.
128 In a case which awards damages on the basis of lost profits, there is a problem
of mitigation of damages. The general contract rule is that there is an absolute duty
on the part of the injured party to mitigate damages. Restatement, Contracts §336(1)
(1932). In Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra note III, however, the court
refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff bad a duty to mitigate damages. The
court felt that the defendant's mitigation argument was "not maintainable under any
construction of the act and appears to be contrary to the tenor and purport of the act."
Id. at 673. In Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, supra note 83, on the other
hand, it was held to be error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages, particularly since the defendant offered to
repurchase some of the useless part and inventory. Id. at 446. The Volkswagen approach
seems to be the better one on this point. For a complete discussion of the dealer's duty
to mitigate damages, see Comment, 74 Yale L.J. 354, 370-75 (1964).
122 Kessler 1188-89.
130 Ibid.
131 Comment, .74 Yale L.J. 354, 375-77 (1964).
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Concerning the measure of damages used, it is submitted that estimated
loss of profits, even with all the uncertainty, is the best approach in most
cases. Such an approach reflects more adequately the real loss sustained by
the dealer,laa since all the investment and time that were expended toward
the goal of producing a profit were lost as a result of the manufacturer's lack
of good faith. The fact that certainty cannot be attained should not prevent
the dealer from recovering, nor should it allow the manufacturer to escape
liability for its unlawful act.'" Due to the lack of preciseness in proof, the
jury is likely to have a great deal of discretion in assessing damages, and
will probably favor the dealer. Perhaps such favoritism is not altogether
undesirable, since it would promote the policies of the act. Control over
jury abuse of discretion remains in the court, moreover, by the use of the
remittitur procedure.'"
As an alternative to the private suit and damage remedy, most of the
twenty states attempting to regulate the dealer-manufacturer relationship
have adopted licensing statutes.'" Under such statutes, manufacturers and
their representatives must obtain a license to do business in the state, and
this license can be revoked or suspended if the state law is violated. From
these statutes, both formai and informal enforcement procedures have been
developed.'" The formal procedures involve hearings before the state agency
designated to enforce the act. The informal procedures, on the other hand,
are similar to a mediation situation wherein the state agency acts as an
advisor rather than in its quasi-judicial capacity. 137 The formal procedures
have been rarely used, and there has been no suspension or revocation as a
result of these procedures,138 whereas the informal procedures have been
more frequently used, and the dealer and manufacturer have often been able
to achieve a settlement.139
Some states have adopted penal sanctions to enforce their dealers'
acts.'" In those states, certain conduct by manufacturers against dealers has
been made criminal, and enforcement is left to local prosecutors. These penal
provisions have never been applied.' 41 Such criminal sanctions do not seem
162 In Volkswagen, the dealer attempted to recover damages to his reputation caused
by the termination. The court, however, analogizing the situation to employment-contract
cases, found that there was no basis for such damages under the act. 360 F.2d at 446.
In employment-contract cases, the rationale for denying recovery-of-reputation damages
is the unforeseeability of such harm when the contract was made. E.g., Mastoras v. Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. Ry., 217 Fed. 153 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
133 In 1964, Senator Morse introduced a bill to amend the Dealers' Act to allow a
recovery of treble damages. 110 Cong. Rec. 3793-94 (1964). Such an amendment would
not solve the uncertainty problem, for the jury would still first have to reach a figure to
be multiplied by three.
134
 Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1251-52 (1957).
135 E.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 563 (1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01 (1957), as
amended by Wis. Stat. Ann. § 218.01 (Supp. 1966).
136 See generally Macaulay 793-812.
137 Ibid.
138 Id. at 809.
139 Id. at 810.




to be a proper remedy for a civil statute which requires the parties to a
contract to act in good faith. Dealers' acts, be they state or federal, are
essentially statutory modifications of basic contract law, 142
 and have tradi-
tionally been enforced civilly. The statute should not change to a criminal
violation what has always been a civil action. The fact that there has never
been a criminal complaint filed by a dealer against a manufacturer is, by
itself, some evidence that dealers also believe that criminal actions are no
way to resolve their differences with the manufacturers.
B. Equitable Relief
The Dealers' Act does not provide for equitable relief, nor does the
legislative history of the act reveal any congressional intent to grant such
relief. Nevertheless, in Bateman v. Ford Motor Co.,143 the court of appeals
held that the district court, by virtue of its general equity power, could
grant a temporary injunction prohibiting the manufacturer from terminating
the franchise until the case was heard on the damage issue.'" The court
felt that granting the injunction would preserve the effectiveness of the
remedy provided by the statute. 145
There are at least two reasons to question the wisdom of allowing a court
to grant a temporary injunction. First, the absence of any consideration of
equitable relief in the history of the act raises an inference that Congress
did not intend it to be granted. The Clayton Act, for example, makes specific
provision for equitable relief.'" Furthermore, that provision granting equi-
table relief was probably enacted to specifically counteract"T Sherman Act
decisions which denied injunctive relief because there was no specific grant
of such relief in that act. 148
 Moreover, in 1964, an amendment was presented
to Congress which would have allowed equitable relief to be available
in Dealers' Act cases. 1" Since no action was taken on the amendment, it
may be implied that Congress had no desire to grant equitable relief in
these cases.
Second, the franchise relationship is a personal one which is usually
terminable at will. 15° It is somewhat analogous to the partnership-contract
situation in the sense that two parties who were originally amicable have
142 General Motors Corp. v. Mac Co,, 247 F. Supp. 723, 725 (D. Colo. 1965).
143 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962).
144
 Id. at 66. Accord, Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp.
600 (D. Mich. 1963); Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.
1965).
145
 On remand, the district court refused to grant the temporary injunction, because
the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof, which required a showing of "bad faith,
coercion, discrimination, or threatened irreparable harm. . . ." Bateman v. Ford Motor
Co., 204 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 310 F.2d 805 (3d Cir.
1962).
148
 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
147 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 475 al (1917).
148 For Sherman Act cases which have held that private injunctive relief could not
be given, see Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904); Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S, 540 (1902).
340 110 Cong. Rec. 3793-94 ( 1 964).
13° Macaulay 564-65.
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had a disagreement and no longer wish to be associated with each other. In
partnership cases, the courts refuse to compel one party to continue the
relationship if there is a termination-at-will clause.'" Furthermore, allowance
of injunctive relief in a case in which the adverse parties are in a continuous
business relationship would create practical problems for the courts. Since
the courts would be compelling a continuing relationship, they would have
to exercise constant supervision over the parties, a task which the courts
neither favor nor perform well.' 52
The court in Bateman, however, felt that there were two compelling
reasons for allowing an injunction to be issued. First, it felt that the dealer
might have to wait years before his damage suit was decided; 153 second,
it pointed out that unless the injunction were issued for the period between
the effective date of the termination and the damage decision, the dealer's
business would be completely destroyed.'" Neither of these reasons is con-
vincing. With regard to the length of time that the dealer must wait for his
damage recovery, the mere fact of delay should not be sufficient reason to
allow resort to the injunction.'" Furthermore, the court apparently over-
looked the fact that upon decision of the damage suit and dissolution of the
temporary injunction, the manufacturer could destroy the dealer's business
by arbitrarily terminating at that point, just as he would have destroyed
it had the injunction not been issued. In effect, the dealer had merely
received a postponement of the date of termination.
It is submitted that such a postponement is inconvenient and costly
for the manufacturer, and unnecessary in order to give the dealer adequate
protection. The inconvenience to the manufacturer stems from the fact that
had it been allowed to terminate, it could have enfranchised a dealer who
would have been more satisfactory to it. Thus, during the period of the in-
junction, the manufacturer may well be losing sales and goodwill by having to
tolerate an inefficient dealer. On the other hand, if the injunction were not
issued and the franchise were terminated, any recovery received by the dealer
for lost profits would include the period during which the injunction would
have been in force. Thus, since the dealer will be allowed compensatory dam-
ages for the period in question, injunctive relief should not be granted.
The above discussion has analyzed the problems involved with the
issuance of a temporary injunction. One court, however, has implied that a
permanent injunction might lie. 153
 Such a decision seems clearly erroneous,
especially if the franchise has a termination-at-will clause, for in such a
151 E
.g., Fallen) V. Wynacht, 371 P.2d 858 (Mont. 1962). See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d
618 (1960).
152
 The difficulties of policing such an injunction have been. aptly stated by the
Sixth Circuit: "Ulnterwoven obligations remain uncertain in the contract and the nec-
essary result of such a decree would be the continued policing of the conduct of the
parties, . . a task for which the courts are not equipped and which is incapable of
compulsion by usual judicial process." Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 155 F.2d
361, 366 (6th Cir. 1946).
153
 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 143, at 66.
154 Ibid.
155
 Comment, 48 Cornell L.Q. 711, 734 & n.184 (1963).
156
 Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 144, at 325-26.
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case, granting a permanent injunction would effectively read this clause out
of the agreement. Presumably, if such a decree were entered, the manu-
facturer, in order to terminate the franchise, would have to petition the
court to dissolve the injunction. Although obtaining the dissolution would
probably not be difficult if the manufacturer could show cause, requiring a
showing of cause was certainly not within the intent of the parties when they
entered the agreement. In addition, the granting of a permanent injunction
would be contrary to the purposes of the act for two reasons. First, it may
tie the manufacturer to an inefficient dealer, a result not intended by Con-
gress.'" Second, it would result in a lessening of the dealer's motivation to
compete by insuring him of his franchise without the necessity of having to
maintain a satisfactory level of performance. Such a "freezing" of the
automobile distribution system offends federal antitrust policy, which
attempts to foster competition.'" Therefore, it is submitted that the per-
manent injunction should never be granted in Dealers' Act cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Soon after the Dealers' Act was passed, it was predicted that "ultimate
judicial interpretation of the legislation may result in leaving the dealers in
substantially the same position they were in prior to a single enactment." 159
It appears from the results of the cases which have been litigated that this
prediction was accurate. The courts have construed the act's provisions
strictly, as urged by the manufacturers, and as a result, lack of good faith
has taken on such a narrow meaning that the dealer's burden of proof is
almost insurmountable. In fact, in the ten years since passage, only one
case, Volkswagen, has resulted in a judgment for the dealer on the issue
of lack of good faith.
The dealers' dismal record in court may suggest that the act has not
helped the dealers at all. It is quite true that it has not helped those who
have had to go to court. Indeed, dealers suing on the statutory cause of
action have been no more successful than those who sued on a common law
cause of action for breach of contract before the passage of the act. The act,
however, should not be written off as a total failure. It has had a positive
effect on dealer-manufacturer relations in that it has induced the manufac-
turers to rework their franchises and to delete some of the objectionable pro-
visions.'" To this extent the act has accomplished something that the
dealers could not have done by themselves. Moreover, the act has probably
also deterred some of the objectionable practices which were commonplace
157
 H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 9.
158
 See 1956 Hearings 128, 132-33, 246-49.
159
 Brown & Conwill, Automobile Manufacturer-Dealer Legislation, 57 Colum. L.
Rev. 219, 237 (1957).
leo H.R. Rep. No. 2850, at 6-7. The current franchise agreements offer the dealer
the option of a one-year, five-year, or indefinite-term franchise, with the first two
alternatives providing for cancellation only for cause. Dealer Review Boards were also
created as a result of the hearings prior to the act. Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that retired Supreme Court Justice Charles Whittaker was named by General Motors
to serve as an impartial umpire to decide dealer disputes. Macaulay 557, 854 n.880.
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in.the industry before the act was passed; but, of course, it would be im-
possible to measure the extent of this deterrence. Thus, in these two situa-
tions, the act has benefited dealers, albeit those who have not had to take ad-
vantage of its provisions.
On the other hand, the act has undoubtedly encouraged frivolous litiga-
tion, i.e., that type initiated by the dealer with the intent to harass the
manufacturer and perhaps receive an unwarranted settlement. To the extent
that such "strike" suits have been encouraged by the Dealers' Act, it has
been unsuccessful, and has done the dealers' cause more harm than good.
When the act was passed, its major purpose was not to induce changes
in the franchises, nor to indirectly benefit those dealers who did not have
to bring suit. On the contrary, its purpose, as evidenced by the popular
name—"Dealers' Day in Court Act"—was to directly aid those dealers who
had to litigate their rights under their franchises. In this regard, the act has
been almost an unqualified failure, although Volkswagen may represent a
turning point. Perhaps the most basic reason for the impotence of the act
is its language: it was so poorly drafted that the courts have been unable
to implement it. The reason for the poor drafting may have been a congres-
sional desire in the closing days of the 84th Congress to pass "any" act,
and not necessarily an effective one."' The compromise that resulted from
the rush to pass the act was fatal to the act's effectiveness. Thus, in answer
to the question posed at the outset of this comment—whether the act creates
a real or merely an illusory cause of action—it is quite apparent that at this
time the cause of action is illusory. This need not be so in the future, how-
ever, since the favorable opinion in Volkswagen may be the start of increased
dealer success in court. There certainly appears to be enough language in




 See Macaulay 846.
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